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Abstract:
Following the Korean War, Cal Poly was approached to take part in
a program to provide technical education assistance to vocational
schools in the Republic of Korea by the newly formed United States
Foreign Operations Administration. This paper seeks to analyze that
program in the context of Cal Poly’s history, especially in comparison to other international education programs and other dealings
between the University and the United States Government. Although
Cal Poly ultimately never took part in the Korea Program, the negotiation process still provides insight into the priorities of the college
and its place in the context of US history in the early 1950s.

Author Bio: Sam McClintock
Sam is a second-year history major with a minor in Spanish. His historical interests include early twentieth-century history, the Cold War,
and the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. A San Jose native, Sam
enjoys reading, baking, and spending time with his family. After graduating from Cal Poly, he plans on attending grad school.

In the decades following the end of World War II, the United States
emerged as a global superpower and foreign policy was dictated by
reluctance to engage in another total-war conflict on a global scale.
Policies of containment and economic reconstruction developed between the United States and its allies with the goals of limiting the
sphere of Soviet influence and promoting liberal capitalism. Foreign
aid became an important arm of foreign policy within both the Western and Soviet spheres, as each superpower offered financial support
to its potential allies in a bid for the greatest global influence. Cal
Poly, a school of just over 2,000 students nestled along California’s
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central coast, played a unique role as part of that foreign aid in this
game of Cold War Politics.1

and Cummings describes American plans to utilize economic and military measures to pursue these interests.2 Another work by the same
author looks at what that aid was put towards. Korea’s Place in the
Sun, a Modern History describes the poor state of the Republic of Korea’s economy in the 1950s, and how the US was reluctantly willing to
foot the bill for President Syngman Rhee’s plans for industrialization
in order to cultivate a democratic and economically independent body
in what was seen as such a contentious region.3

The California Polytechnic College was one of few schools in America during the 1940s and 1950s that specialized in providing practical
agricultural and mechanical vocational education. At the end of the
Korean War, Cal Poly was approached to take part in the ongoing effort of Korean Reconstruction following the country’s occupation by
Japan that ended after WWII. The college’s educational niche likely
made it an enticing candidate for the proposed Korean aid program
in 1955. The 1955 contract was never signed, however, and Cal Poly
dropped out of negotiations with the Foreign Operations Administration and the Korean Ministry of Education completely. That said, there
is still value in looking back at the program to place the college in the
context of US history during the period. Cal Poly’s proposed Korean
Technical Education Assistance Program exemplified the University’s
belief in its unique philosophy of “Learn by Doing” and reflected patterns of internal decision making in the early years of the Cold War.
In The Korean War: A History, author Bruce Cummings discusses the
United States’ interest in the Korean peninsula in the late 1940s and
early 1950s: containment. The United States saw the region as important to containing the spread of communism in the Soviet periphery,

Looking at the greater project of Korean Reconstruction and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), the article
“Sowing War, Reaping Peace: United Nations Resource Development
Programs in the Republic of Korea, 1950–1953” by Lisa Brady in the
Journal of Asian Studies discusses the impact of ecological damage
caused by the Korean War’s negative effects upon natural resources
and livestock growth, harming efforts to revitalize the Korean agricultural sector after WWII.4 Brady’s argument, unlike prior literature
regarding Korean reconstruction after occupation by Japan, is that the
Korean War greatly impacted efforts to revitalize the region due to
destruction of resources and agricultural regions. David Ekbladh’s ar-

1 Julian McPhee, California State Polytechnic College Annual Report, 1953-54, p.2,
Office of the President Collection, 141.01 Office of the President Annual Reports,
1945-46 - 1954-55, Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo,
CA. 63 Ibid., 136.

2 Bruce Cummings, “A ‘Forgotten War’ That Remade the United States and the Cold
War,” in The Korean War: A History (New York, NY: Random House, 2010), EPUB
version.
3 Bruce Cummings, “Korean Sun Rising: Industrialization, 1953-Present,” in Korea’s
Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2005), EPUB
version.
4 Lisa Brady, “Sowing War, Reaping Peace: United Nations Resource Development
Programs in the Republic of Korea, 1950–1953,” Journal of Asian Studies 77, no. 2
(May 2018): 351–63.
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ticle “How to Build a Nation” in the Wilson Quarterly takes a more
overhead approach to Korean reconstruction since 1945.5 Ekbladh focuses more on American leadership and views Korea as an independent, non-communist state as opposed to Brady’s closer analysis of
factors that affect agricultural and industrial development.

was vital in helping students defer military service in order to focus
on studies, as well as serving as an important part of outreach with the
community.7 This paper, however, does not discuss Cal Poly’s foreign
efforts after the war, and instead provides insight into the school’s
socioeconomic position during the conflict.

Vernon Ruttan’s book United States Development Assistance Policy:
The Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid devotes a section to
the history of university involvement in US foreign aid. The section
outlines how university involvement in foreign aid dates back to Truman’s Point Four Program in 1949 when the President of the Association of Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities pledged to aid the
program, all the way to the US Agency for International Development
(AID) in 1991.6 In the chapter, Ruttan argues that the relationship between universities and foreign aid was often cause for frustration, with
universities continually subject to bureaucratic red tape.

It is worth stipulating that little writing exists explicitly about Cal
Poly’s Korea Program. Most of what is written is not much more
than meeting minutes, personal letters, and high-level administrative
correspondence between the heads of Cal Poly in the early 1950s
and various directors of California State and US Federal departments. Korean Reconstruction was part of a much larger foreign policy campaign, but the extent of Cal Poly’s direct involvement most
likely lies in the Kennedy Library Special Collections and Archives.

Taking a closer look, Cal Poly student Anthony Wong’s paper “Cold
War Culture: The Social Functions of the Cal Poly ROTC from 195357” analyzes the role of ROTC on campus during the Korean War.
Wong concludes that while the ROTC may have been incepted to contribute to the military industrial complex, in reality Cal Poly’s ROTC

5 David Ekbladh, “How to Build a Nation,” Wilson Quarterly 28, no. 1 (Winter 2004):
12–20.
6 Vernon W. Ruttan, “Chapter 9, Universities, Voluntary Organizations, and Public
Foundations: Interests, Clients, and Constituencies,” in United States Development
Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of Foreign Economic Aid, (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 204-220.
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The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. Five days later, on August
1st, a letter appeared on Cal Poly President Julian McPhee’s desk.
This letter came from one L.H. Dennis, then former Executive Secretary of the Vocational Education Administration in Washington,
informing McPhee of a US educational program to aid in the reconstruction of Korea following the war.8 Both McPhee and Dennis
were important figures in vocational education, and this was not the

7 Anthony Wong, “Cold War Culture: The Social Functions of the Cal Poly ROTC
from 1953-57,” The Forum: Journal of History 7, no. 1 (2015), https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/forum/vol7/iss1/6/.
8 Correspondence from L.H. Dennis to Julian McPhee, 1 August 1953, 144.02 Julian
McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea, 1953-55, Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
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first time that the College president had been tipped off to a federal
program that had the potential to benefit the school. Dennis suggested
that McPhee write to J. Russell Andrus, University coordinator for
the newly formed Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), “on the
assumption that your institution might be interested in carrying out an
educational contract abroad.”9 This letter was the catalyst that set off
two years of negotiations between Cal Poly and the FOA to develop an
educational assistance program to aid the Republic of Korea.

the MSA offered economic and military support.12 From the outside,
this consolidation alluded to imperialistic ulterior motives influencing
foreign policy.13 University involvement in the FOA was the result of
Administration Director Harold Stassen’s plan to “reduce MSA technical assistance staff” and shift the load to “private voluntary organizations and colleges and universities.”14 This plan was not without its
problems, and this will be expanded upon later.

The FOA, as Dennis informed McPhee, was “The MSA [Mutual Security Agency], the TCA [Technical Cooperation Administration] and
other Foreign Operations have been merged… in a new administration
known as the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA).”10 The organizations comprising the FOA were consolidated under the Eisenhower administration. As the President put it in 1955,
The Foreign Operations Administration established two years
ago, was intended to centralize all governmental operations, as
distinguished from policy formulation, that had as their purpose
the cooperative development of economic and military strength
among the nations of the free world.11
The merging of these two agencies was viewed questionably by critics,
however. The TCA was part of Truman’s Point Four program to offer
economic and humanitarian aid to contain Soviet expansion, where

McPhee promptly wrote to Andrus, who would be the liaison between
Cal Poly and the US Government during the development of the program. McPhee’s first letter to Andrus acted as a resume, both for himself and the college, much like a similar letter he wrote to the Navy
ten years prior. In the letter, McPhee outlined his own qualifications
as an administrator for agricultural and vocational education for the
state of California and described the facilities at Cal Poly, attaching a
course catalog to entice the University Coordinator with the college’s
offerings.15 Several days later Andrus responded to McPhee’s inquiry,
noting that he had not intended for Dennis to contact the schools that
the two men had discussed as potential candidates for the program.16
Regardless, Andrus noted that Cal Poly was mentioned “as eminently

9 Dennis to McPhee, 1 August 1953.
10 Ibid.
11 Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to Secretary Dulles, 17 April 1955, The American
Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/234127.

12 Ruttan, 206.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 205.
15 Correspondence from Julian McPhee to J. Russell Andrus, 26 August 1953, 144.02
Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea, 1953-55, Special
Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
16 Correspondence from J. Russell Andrus to Julian McPhee, 31 August 1953, 144.02
Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea, 1953-55, Special
Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
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suited for undertaking a contract in the field of training vocational
education teachers—both in the agricultural and industrial fields.”17
Andrus thanked McPhee for sending his and Cal Poly’s credentials
but stated that it was ultimately the decision of the Republic of Korea what school would be contracted for the program.18 While it may
seem overzealous for McPhee to have written directly to the person responsible for contracting American institutions of education
without prior introduction, it is important to consider the result. As
a direct result of the letter, Cal Poly received a copy of the generic
contract that the US government had used previously to broker deals
between American institutions and foreign countries. Word quickly
spread through the college, and within the first months of interest in
the program Cal Poly instructors were writing to the President for
their consideration in the program.19 The American Book Company,
a textbook company, even wrote to McPhee, offering to provide the
textbooks that would be used for the program.20
McPhee had a knack for pursuing external projects that he felt would
benefit the school. Prior to and during WWII, Cal Poly was converted into a Naval Flight Preparatory School through a contract with the

US Navy. The beginning of the negotiation process with the Navy
was noticeably similar to early negotiations with the FOA. In both
cases, the US government had need to fulfill. McPhee, with all his
connections, heard about this need and pounced on the opportunity.
In a letter dated October 1942, McPhee wrote to L.H. Dennis, the
same official who would contact him about the Korea Program a
decade later, outlining Cal Poly’s facilities and the advantages to
hosting a Naval Preparatory Program at his school.21 In the letter,
McPhee praised Cal Poly’s location on the Central Coast and outlined the facilities that the school had in place, and how those may
have been used for a number of aircraft and engineering programs
suitable to the Navy.22 He ended the letter to Dennis by laying out a
timeline of all the other people he had contacted about starting a Naval Program and then asked Dennis to use his connections in Washington to move the program along for him.23 This strategy worked.
A few weeks later, McPhee was contacted by the Navy, who had
“plans to inaugurate a program to provide aviation ground school
instruction for cadets prior to their pre-flight training,” and asked
McPhee to outline the available facilities at Cal Poly.24 In May of
1943, a contract between the Cal Poly Foundation and the US Gov-

17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Correspondence from Harry K. Wolf to Julian McPhee, 15 September 1953,
144.02 Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, Korea, Personnel—
Applications, Salary Schedules, 1953-55, Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly,
San Luis Obispo, CA.
20 Correspondence from Hilda E. Henke to Julian McPhee, 22 January 1954, 144.02
Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea, 1953-55, Special
Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.

21 Correspondence from Julian McPhee to L.H. Dennis, 21 October 1942, 144.02
McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 14, Navy Flight Program, 1942-1950,
Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
22 McPhee to Dennis, 21 October 1942.
23 Ibid.
24 Correspondence from F.U. Lake to Julian McPhee, 31 October 1942, 144.02
McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 14, Navy Flight Program, 1942-1950,
Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
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ernment was drawn up. This contract would see the use of Cal Poly’s land and facilities as a Naval Flight Preparatory School.25 This
headfirst approach to contracts with the US government was clearly
an M.O. for McPhee, which explains his upfront nature in advocating for the Korea Program. The Navy contract kept Cal Poly open
during the war, and the resulting population expansion following it
may have been in part to the visibility the Naval Program brought to
the school. It is possible that a similar goal, be that money, exposure,
or prestige, motivated the President’s approach to negotiating for the
Korea Program.

“Report of the Vocational Education Mission to Korea, March 13,
1954, to April 17, 1954”, and presented their findings to members of
the FOA and UNKRA.28 The shape of the program that was ultimately devised was this: a three-way contract between the Republic of
Korea’s ministry of Education, the Foreign Operations Administration of the United States, and the Cal Poly Foundation was written.29

Within six months of McPhee’s first letter to Andrus, a group was
sent on a month-long fact-finding trip to Korea to analyze the conditions of vocational schools in the country and develop an initial
report to decide how the United States, and thus Cal Poly, would
aid those institutions.26 The group consisted of Chester McCorkle,
Cal Poly Dean of Instruction and McPhee’s right-hand man, Graham
Sullivan, Contra Costa Junior College District Dean of Curriculum,
and Dr. Raymond Gregory, Special Assistant to the Commissioner of
Education and a big name in vocational education, who also directed
the mission.27 As a result of the trip, Gregory and McCorkle authored

It is interesting to note that the arm of Cal Poly that negotiated with
the FOA and the Republic of Korea was the Cal Poly Foundation,
which still exists today as the Cal Poly Corporation. The Cal Poly
Foundation was founded in 1940 “for the purpose of furthering the
educational aims and the administrative objectives of the College,
the Foundation follows the policy of conducting business operations
that will be a basis for instruction in best practices.”30 Foundation
programs at the time involved housing, dining, providing basic training from project work, health needs, and even loaning equipment

25 Contract NOp 4 (formerly NOd 3114) between The United States of America and
California Polytechnic School Foundation, 15 May 1943, 144.02 McPhee Presidential
Papers Collection, Box 14, Lease (NOp4) U.S. Navy--CPS Foundation, 1943, Special
Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
26 Correspondence from Julian McPhee to Roy Simpson, 22 March 1954, 144.02
Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea, 1953-55, Special
Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
27 McPhee to Simpson, 22 March 1954.

28 Interdepartmental Correspondence,” Report of the Vocational Education Mission
to Korea” attached, Chester McCorkle to members of the President’s council, 144.02
Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea—April 8, 1955
Meeting, McCorkle & Wilson, 1935[sic.]-54, Special Collections and Archives, Cal
Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
29 (Draft) Agreement of The Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea, The
Foreign Operations Administration of the United States of America, and The California State Polytechnic College Foundation, May 1955, 144.02 Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, Korea,1955, Special Collections and Archives, Cal
Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
30 Julian McPhee, Annual Report California State Polytechnic College, 1951-52, p.12,
Office of the President Collection, 141.01 Office of the President Annual Reports,
1945-46 - 1954-55, Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
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and money for student projects.31 The foundation ultimately expanded the scope of what Cal Poly could do for its students while keeping
money at the school through its organization as a non-profit corporation. And, although technically a separate body, the foundation was
still under the umbrella of the president of the College—McPhee.32

rectors sat at the top.36 The Foundation Manager and Program Director
were below them, and project consultants were below them. Organization then split into two branches. One branch would take up office
space at Cal Poly, comprised of two curriculum assistants, a clerical
worker, and a bookkeeper.37 The other branch consisted of the personnel that would be on the ground in Korea: The Chief of Party, five
agricultural instructors, five industrial instructors, an office manager,
and three office workers.38 Overall, by the summer of 1955, when the
program was set to get off the ground, the Cal Poly side of the agreement had developed a robust plan according to their understanding of
their role in the program.

Under the contract, each party had its mutually agreed-to role. The
Cal Poly Foundation would provide personnel and equipment to aid
in agricultural and industrial education at Korean vocational training
schools and would submit annual budgets of the cost to the other
members of the agreement.33 The Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea would provide facilities and transportation in Korea
and would advise on budgets and planning.34 The FOA would provide transportation to and from Korea and cover allowances spent by
instructors, essentially footing the bill until they saw a return from
their Korean investment.35 Many iterations of this contract were exchanged between the parties ironing out the specifics, but the general themes of Cal Poly providing instructors and equipment to aid
Korean vocational education institutions while the FOA paid for it
remains consistent throughout all versions. The rather general nature
of this contract essentially gave the Cal Poly Foundation freedom to
structure its end of the program in a way it saw fit. The structure that
McPhee eventually drew up was hierarchical in nature; the heads of
the Cal Poly Foundation, including the president and the board of di-

31 McPhee, Annual Report 1951-1952, p. 13.
32 Ibid., 12.
33 Ministry, FOA, Foundation agreement, 1-5.
34 Ibid., 14-16.
35 Ibid., 6-13.
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Cal Poly’s Other International Programs
In the context of Cal Poly’s International Programs, the Korea Program was a standout. It would have been the first program that had
Cal Poly go abroad rather than the other way around. To get a sense of
how the Korea Program was different, it helps to look back. Foreign
students had been attending Cal Poly for many years. The first year
that the school officially recognized the number of students enrolled
from foreign countries is 1946.39 Prior annual reports dating back to

36 Julian McPhee, Chart of Proposed Organization of Korean Project, 1955, 144.02
Julian McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, Korea,1955, Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
37 McPhee, Chart of Proposed Organization of Korea Program.
38 Ibid.
39 Julian McPhee, 1946 Annual Report to the State Board of Education on the Progress of the California State Polytechnic School, January 1947, p.9, Special Collections
and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
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1940 lump students from other states and foreign countries together
as one statistic.40 It is not until 1950 that the more precise records of
foreign student enrollments are kept, keeping track of what countries
these students came from and what majors they took at Cal Poly.41 The
majors that international students took as well as countries of origin
vary wildly throughout the fifties. Many came from throughout South
and Central America: another important theater in US foreign policy
during the Cold War. This is especially true of the early years that Cal
Poly kept track of these numbers, with 22 of the 49 total foreign students enrolled at Cal Poly in the fall of 1950 hailing from 8 of the
United States’ Latin American neighbors.42 As the decade carried on,
this trend of students from contentious satellite countries coming to Cal
Poly grew, with enrollments from throughout Latin America, East and
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. It may seem surprising that the
countries that consistently saw the highest enrollment at Cal Poly were
Iran and Iraq—countries that would face turmoil caused by Cold War
politics in the decades to come. Both countries had numbers of students
in the double digits, with 39 of 197 total students in the fall of 1957
hailing from Iran alone.43

gram with Indonesia.44 Like the Korea Program, this program was in
collaboration with the US Government and a foreign nation. Unlike
the Korea Program, the Indonesia “Farm Machinery” program saw
Indonesian students arrive at Cal Poly instead of sending university
staff abroad. The 15 participants came to Cal Poly to learn farming techniques using the school’s facilities that they did not have
access to otherwise, such as tractors and irrigation infrastructure.45
Additionally, the Indonesian students traveled to other Land-Grant
schools in the US to learn about industrial farming methods. The
goal was for these students to return to Indonesia with the technical
training of industrialized agriculture in order to share that knowledge and advance the Indonesian agricultural economy.46

In 1952, another international education program similar to the Korea
Program took place at Cal Poly. This was the “Farm Machinery” pro-

The Korea Program Falls Apart
On July 28, 1955, Dean McCorkle sent a wire to Andrus declaring
that it would probably be in everyone’s best interest to cease negotiations about a Korean Program with Cal Poly.47 McCorkle cited
a series of meetings with state officials concerning the budget and
legality of the program. The specifics of the decision to cease the

40 McPhee, 1946 Annual Report, p.9.
41 1950-51 Student Directories, 612.03 Student Directories Foreign Students Redacted Copies, Box 5, Student Directories, Foreign Students [Redacted Copy] 1950-1951,
Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
42 Ibid.
43 1957-1958 Student Directories, 612.03 Student Directories Foreign Students Redacted Copies, Box 5, Student Directories, Foreign Students [Redacted Copy] 19571958, Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.

44 Revised Program and Itinerary for TA 97-34—Indonesia ”Farm Machinery,” 31
October 1952, 451 International Education, AID Programs, Peace Corps (others),
1952-1973, USDA/Cal Poly: Program and Itinerary—Indonesia ”Farm Machinery,”
Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
45 Itinerary and Program—Indonesia “Farm Machinery,” 31 October 1952.
46 Ibid.
47 Correspondence from McCorkle to Andrus, 28 July 1955, 144.02 McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, Korea, 1955, Special Collections and Archives,
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
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agreement were clarified in another letter to Andrus later that summer. Essentially, because Cal Poly was part of the State College System, the State Departments of Finance and Education had concerns
about the legality of the Cal Poly Foundation, an independent body,
sending state college employees abroad; who would pay their salaries? How?48 As a result, the possibility of including more parties to
the contract to cover the legality of it was considered. This, however,
would have unnecessarily complicated the negotiations and would
have required new agreements to be written.
Another problem was that of philosophy. In an earlier letter in June,
McPhee outlined the problems with the most recent interim contract
proposed by the FOA and the news that only $60,000 for the first
stage of the program, much lower than initially calculated, could be
allocated to get the program off the ground.49 In the letter, McPhee
stated that,
From the beginning, our main interest in this proposed Korean
technical assistance program has been that interest aroused in us
by officials of the FOA and the U.S. Office of Education who
expressed confidence that the California State Polytechnic College, with its philosophy of practical education, could contribute
significantly to the solving of agricultural and industrial voca-

McClintock
tional education problems in Korea. If we set out to provide only
technicians with but little administrative time available for planning and guidance, which the interim contract clearly shows to
be the intent, it will mean that we have a program in name only.50
By this point in Cal Poly’s history, “Learn by Doing” had become an
integral part of the college’s educational programs, and a factor that
made it particularly unique. The school had been in operation for more
than fifty years at this point and was clearly very proud of its approach.
McPhee was very protective of his school’s philosophy, reacting to the
FOA’s offer like a slap in the face. Concerns about “Learn by Doing”
had been hanging in the air since the first mutterings of the Korea
Program. Internally, Dean of Agriculture Vard Shepard had expressed
to McPhee the potential difficulties of doing “Learn by Doing” in Asia
from the very beginning. Shepard felt that ingrained traditional values and agricultural practices in Asia would make Cal Poly’s style
of teaching unappealing, and Korean students would be reluctant to
forego those traditions for American values.51
Organizational troubles and misfortune also plagued the program
from above. FOA director Stassen had a tendency to issue policy
directives without any consultation, leading to an explosion of university programs under his leadership.52 This would ultimately lead

48 Correspondence, McCorkle to Andrus, 29 September 1955, 144.02 McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, Korea, 1953-55, Special Collections and Archives,
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
49 Correspondence from McPhee to Andrus, 29 June 1955, 144.02 McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea--Contract Negotiations, Current, 1955,
Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.

50 McPhee to Andrus, 29 June 1955.
51 Interdepartmental Correspondence, from Vard M. Shepard to Julian McPhee, 24
September 1953, 144.02 McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, 042.1 Korea, 1953-55, Special Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
52 Ruttan, 205.
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to conflict when the FOA dissolved in June 1955, transferring all programs to the newly formed International Cooperation Administration
(ICA).53 The newly-appointed director of the ICA, John B. Hollister,
had little interest in technical assistance and believed supplying capital
instead of personnel made for more efficient foreign assistance.54 Lack
of communication from Stassen likely caused Cal Poly administration
to be blindsided by the sudden change in policy, souring a deal they
thought they had more control over. Additionally, Dr. Raymond Gregory had passed away in June 1954, not long after returning from the
Korea mission surveying vocational schools he had directed.55 Gregory
had been a driving force for the Korea program from the start, and his
unfortunate passing likely sucked the wind from the program’s sails in
Washington. Internationally, the UNKRA and the Republic of Korea
had been at odds for some time, with Syngman Rhee proposing grandiose plans of industrial development to be built with blank checks, while
the US and the UN wanted to ensure more focused efforts and were unwilling to indulge the President’s lofty dreams.56 The US sought to use
military installations to pursue its goals of containment whilst cutting
aid costs, while Rhee continued to leverage the value of his nation’s
position to keep aid dollars funneling into his pockets.57

53 Correspondence, Eisenhower to Dulles, 17 April 1955.
54 Ruttan, p. 206-207.
55 “Raymond W. Gregory,” School Life 36, no.9 (1954): 138.
56 Philip C. Rowe, “Korean Aid: Huge U.S. Economic Program Barely Moves, Rhee
Demands More, Ignores Fiscal Reform,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 1954.
57 Bruce Cummings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, Chapter Six, “Korean Sun Rising: Industrialization, 1953-Present.”
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Legacy of the Program
None of this is to say that nothing ever came out of the Korean Technical Education Assistance Program. Just because Cal Poly never
went to Korea in the 1950s does not mean that the school has been
absent from the international community before or since. The Indonesia Farm Machinery Program of 1952 is just one example of
the Cal Poly’s contribution to US foreign aid initiative. Later, in the
decade following the Korea Program, the ICA was reorganized into
the US Agency for International Development (AID) in 1961.58 Cal
Poly’s involvement in international AID and peace corps programs
greatly expanded under McPhee’s successor, President Robert Kennedy, in the late sixties and seventies. The groundwork and networking that took place as part of the Korea Program may have been influential in getting those programs off the ground, acting as a dry run
for Cal Poly’s interactions with later US foreign aid programs. Cal
Poly Study Abroad programs continue into the twenty-first century
and fulfill the “Learn by Doing” philosophy for Cal Poly students
that would have been absent in the final state of the Korea Program.
Ultimately, Cal Poly—and by a very short stretch, McPhee—had its
own priorities and identity that it stuck to above all else. Firm, unwavering pride in the philosophy of “Learn by Doing” played a huge
role in all parts of the Korea Program. Participation in the Korea Program was a golden opportunity to advertise the idea and the school
that McPhee pounced on, just like he did with the Navy Program,
and the failure of the program to live up to McPhee’s esteem is what

58 Ruttan, 208.
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led to its end. McPhee constantly seemed to be pursuing some program or deal that he thought would benefit the school, but only for so
long before moving on to the next thing. Both the Navy Program and
the establishment of the Cal Poly Foundation exemplify such initiatives designed to fund or expand the school. At one point during
negotiations for the Korea Program, McPhee expressed concern to
McCorkle about the slow pace of the program in lieu of “so many
other irons in the fire.”59 Annual reports from the early to mid-1950s
refer to those years as a “period of expansion” for Cal Poly, alluding
to other projects with the same intent of growing the school and its
resources.60 For example, 1955 was the first year that women were
readmitted to Cal Poly.61 Administrative pressure from the State of
California ultimately forced McPhee’s hand on that decision, and if
that pressure was one of the “irons in the fire,” Cal Poly was ultimately all the better for it. While it is sad to see how bureaucratic
gridlock and one man’s insistence led to the failure of a program
that may have been one-of-a-kind in its execution, Cal Poly‘s Korea
Program acts as a microcosm of the college in the early years of the
Cold War, and eventually led to an expansion of the school and its
programs that still reverberate today.

59 Correspondence, Julian McPhee to Chester McCorkle, 13 August 1954, 144.02
McPhee Presidential Papers Collection, Box 29, Korea, 1953-55, Special Collections
and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
60 Julian McPhee, Annual Report, California Polytechnic State College, 1955-56,
May 1956, 141.01 Office of the President Annual Reports, 1955-56 - 1979-80 Special
Collections and Archives, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo, CA.
61 Julian McPhee, Annual Report, 1955-56.
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